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whether a physical or per se taking occurred. As a result, the court
held that the government action did not constitute a physical or per se
taking, and granted the motion for partial summaryjudgment.
Ryan Malarky
STATE COURTS
CALIFORNIA
Concerned McCloud Citizens v. McCloud Cmty. Servs. Dist., 54
Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that a contingent sales
agreement for spring water, which stipulated that there must be an
environmental review, did not constitute approval of a project).
On October 1, 2003, the McCloud Community Services District
(the "District") approved a proposed agreement with Nestle Waters
North America, Inc. ("Nestle") to purchase and sell up to 1,600 acre
feet of spring water per year for bottling. The agreement set up a
process by which both parties were responsible for designing specific
details of the proposed project. For example, Nestle was required to
pick a site for its bottling plant and the District was responsible for designing a collection system. The agreement would not bind either party until the District completed compliance with the California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA"), and there existed no possibility of a
challenge under the CEQA.
Concerned McCloud Citizens, an unincorporated citizens group
formed to protect natural and cultural resources in the area, filed a
petition for a writ of mandate. They argued that the agreement should
be vacated because the District failed to conduct an environmental
review pursuant to requirements under CEQA.
The Superior Court, Siskiyou County, granted the request for the
writ of mandate and ordered that part of the agreement be set aside.
The District and Nestle appealed arguing that Concerned McCloud
Citizens lacked standing to challenge the agreement and that compliance with CEQA was not required before the District approved the
agreement.
The Court of Appeal for the Third District of California found that
Concerned McCloud Citizens had standing to bring suit. A state statute barred any person from maintaining an action unless they objected to the project orally or in writing prior to the close of a public
comment period. However, the court held that the statute was not
applicable because the District did not hold a public hearing or allow
for a comment period.
The court, however, held that the agreement between the District
and Nestle did not constitute approval of a project pursuant to CEQA;
therefore, the agreement was not subject to environmental review.
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The court concluded that the agreement did not give Nestle any vested
rights and did not legally commit the District to any definite course of
action because the agreement was dependant on many contingencies,
including full compliance with CEQA. Further, the court noted that
because of the lack of specificity in the details of the proposed project,
preparation of an environmental review would have been premature.
The court set aside the trial court's judgment granting Concerned
McCloud Citizen's petition for writ of mandate and remanded the case
to the lower court with instructions to enter a new judgment denying
the petition.
Jacob Schlesinger
County of Imperial v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 145 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2007) (holding that the California Environmental Quality Act
requires water districts to be named as parties in county's actions, and
unnamed water districts were indispensable parties).
Imperial Irrigation District ("Imperial") and San Diego County Water Authority ("San Diego") entered into an agreement to transfer
200,000 acre feet of water per year ("afy") and agreed to conserve
100,000 afy for possible future acquisition by The Metropolitan Water
District of Southern California ("Metropolitan") and Coachella Valley
Water District ("Coachella"). The State Water Resources Control
Board ("Board") approved this transfer. The County of Imperial
("County") filed two petitions challenging aspects of the Board's approval under the California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA").
Neither petition named Metropolitan or Coachella as a party. Imperial
demurred and argued that the County failed to name Metropolitan or
Coachella, who were indispensable parties in both proceedings. The
trial court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend, finding
Metropolitan and Coachella were indispensable parties and that the
statute of limitations had run. County filed a petition for a writ of
mandate and argued the trial court abused its discretion. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the ruling.
On appeal, County challenged the Board's approval of Imperial
and San Diego's transfer and challenged the transfer under CEQA.
However, the main issue of dispute was whether Metropolitan and
Coachella were indispensable parties. Therefore, the court only addressed this limited procedural issue.
Imperial, Metropolitan and Coachella all possess water rights on
the Colorado River as part of the Seven Party Agreement. Imperial is
the largest single holder of water rights on the Colorado River in California, and it provides enough water to irrigate 500,000 acres and delivers waters for other services. All three entities have their water rights
linked in a priority system, with Imperial having the highest priority
rights and thus the ability to divert its full right to water before Metro-

